

# **INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**

**FONDATION MAISON DES SCIENCES DE L'HOMME, PARIS  
THE COLUMBIA INSTITUTE FOR SCHOLARS AT REID HALL, PARIS**

## **Report on the Project**

### **REPRESENTATIONS AND DISCOURSES OF TRUST AND DEMOCRACY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH**

**September 2003-December 2003.**

#### **PARTICIPANTS:**

**Ivana Markova, University of Stirling, Scotland, UK (co-ordinator)**

**Michele Grossen, University of Laussane, Switzerland**

**Per Linell, University of Linkoping, Sweden**

**Li Liu, Beijing Normal University, China**

**Anne Salazar-Orvig, University René Descartes, Paris III, France**

#### **Introduction**

This project evolved from the programme of research of a well-established network of social psychologists supported by the European Laboratory of Social Psychology (LEPS) in the MSH since 1990. There are two social scientific aspects from which this project has developed: first, the study of social representations of democracy and second, the study of dialogue and social representations.

Concerning the first aspect, it was after the fall of the Berlin Wall that a group of social psychologists initiated a series of studies into social representations of democracy, the study of the individual and of responsibility in post-communist countries - and from that time on the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme has been heavily involved in, and has given a great deal of support to the group. The questions of trust, distrust and fear and their role in democratic transformation became important aspects of this research. Therefore, in 1999 an international seminar on political trust was organised in the Maison Suger in collaboration with the British Academy. Subsequently, on 13-15 September 2001, another international conference on political trust in post-communist Europe was organised in the British Academy in London in collaboration with the MSH. The outcome of the latter conference is a book edited by I. Markova (2004), *Trust and Democratic Transition in Post-communist Europe*, Oxford University Press, for the British Academy.

The second aspect of our work in the LEPS has been work on dialogue, focus groups and social representations (e.g. I. Markova and B. Orfali (eds.)

*Focus Groups*, a special issue for the *Bulletin de Psychologie* (in French), published in June 2004.

These two aspects of our work on social representations, trust and democracy and dialogue have created a solid basis of our International Programme for Advanced Studies project as well as of related international collaboration. We postulated the following problems to be explored in the IPAS project:

1. Can we formulate research questions that would enable to distinguish, linguistically, pragmatically and conceptually, between more permanent and more transient aspects of representations of trust and democracy?
2. What kinds of issues are theoretically important and empirically meaningful in the historically and culturally based study of the relations between trust and democracy in common thinking and language?
3. Is it feasible to evaluate (at least partially) the role of affect and passions in a historically and culturally based perspective of trust and democracy in human thinking and discourse?
4. Can the contemporary political events be used as resources to reinterpret the past and to reconstruct new social representations of past events? And, on the contrary, how are past events used as resources to make sense of the present political events?
5. With the above issues in mind, what kinds of empirical problems do we need to address in the study of trust/distrust in discourse?

#### **Organization of the work and seminars during the IPAS project:**

We organised work in two directions that were mutually interdependent.

#### **I. Internal seminars**

During the three-month period the group met regularly on Wednesdays afternoon, 2-5 p.m. in Reid Hall. There was always someone from the group responsible for the organization of these meetings. This individual usually presented a written paper or a list of topics for discussion. In addition, we had irregular meetings in Reid Hall and in the Maison Suger when we needed to continue discussion and analysis of a specific problem. Per Linell kept notes during these meetings, which he re-wrote afterwards, resulting in a document of 13.000 words. A summary presented below is based on this document. This working document contains three sets of ideas:

- i) on trust in discourse
- ii) on focus groups as an empirical resource for the study of trust related issues
- iii) on trust and democracy in different cultures

#### **Summary of the working document on Trust, Social Representations and Discourse.**

Trust concerns the basic self-other interdependence indigenous to the human condition. Relations of trust are significant for the social psychology of self's and other's identities. Trust is therefore a very basic

notion in human interaction, communication and socialisation (Georg Simmel). It implies ubiquity and taken-for-grantedness.

### **1. The semantics of trust and distrust**

Trust belongs to a semantic field which involves many related concepts. This field varies across languages and historical epochs. It is based on self-other relationship. At the same time, it seems to be an other-oriented concept ("trust in someone else"); something similar applies to some other concepts in the semantic field, like *confidence*, *faith*, *belief*, *confidentiality*, etc. (Cf. *confidence*, from *con* + *fidere*.) Conversely, other concepts, like *responsibility*, *authenticity*, *sincerity* are self-oriented. The same applies to the relevant antonyms in the semantic fields involved: *distrust*, *disbelief*, *doubt*, *risk*, *fear* (feeling of), *(in)security*, *(un)certainty*. All of these concepts must be understood in social terms. In addition, they relate to such explicitly interactional and interpersonal notions as *cooperation*, *solidarity*, *reciprocity*, *(communication)*, *persuasion*. "Trust" and "confidence" and their semantic or conceptual fields, have been analysed mostly by philosophers (von Wright, Hertzberg etc). Hertzberg (1988) talks about a "grammar" of reliance and trust.

Both "trust" and "confidence" are polysemic concepts/words, which take on different meanings in different contexts. Their lexical or conceptual meanings could, just like in the case of most other words or lexicalised concepts, be described in terms of family resemblance and meaning potentials (cf. Rommetveit, 1974). Thus, the situated meanings of "trust/confidence" will vary with situated activity types and socio-historical contexts. "Trust" may vary from emotionally impregnated, unconditional, personalised reliance on others to more cognitively penetrated belief in persons or institutions. The referential domains vary from (other) *persons* via *institutions* and organisations (and their representatives) to *ideologies*. Trust and confidence occur against a horizon of possible fears and risks.

### **2. Levels and contexts of trust.**

If "trust" and "confidence" appear at many levels and in many contexts, we may profit from distinguishing between at least four levels (which is not to assume that these levels do not overlap, or may be reflexively related):

(I) Basic trust; this is the kind of very close attachment occurring in (normal cases of) infant-caregiver relations.

(II) In-group solidarity trust: here we deal with social solidarity, social cohesion and social ties within the family (or extended family, clan), friends, neighbours, co-activists etc.

(III) Trust (or distrust) in more general, anonymous, perhaps unidentified others; here we find "institutional interactions", e.g. the relations and encounters between professionals and customers, clients, patients, and other lay people. We find of course quite different kinds of relations

depending on professional categories, communicative (and other) activity types, kinds of institutions.

(IV) Trust (or distrust) within broader social contexts, such as in public, political life. One may dispute the ontological status of "macro" concepts. Are they abstract, theoretical, analytic ways of talking of level (II and) III phenomena? Are they "communicatively constructed" when people are asked to make meta-statements about society (such as in the "Eurobarometer")? But belief in such notions may lead to real social consequences (Thomas, 1926): concrete behaviours such as tax evasion and mis-use of social welfare systems reflect low levels of trust IV?

### **3. Basic ontogenetic trust.**

Trust also plays a crucial role in ontogenesis, according to dialogical theories of early development, e.g. of E. Erikson (1968), who looks upon basic trust as the first element of mental life (before feelings of autonomy, initiative). Erikson speaks about this as a quasi-religious phenomenon invoking notions of omnipotence. Religion is the oldest institution that has served to maintain fundamental trust.

Other dialogical accounts of ontogenesis (homing in on intersubjectivity, reciprocity, the other as an object of attention) can be found in the work of D. Stern, Bråten, and Papousek. Other research studies often link attachment with psychodynamic theory (M.Klein, Winnicott). Cf. also the famous experiments by Mary Ainsworth (attachment theory); being "secure/insecure" determines stances with respect to novel things.

### **4. Socio-historical variations and developments**

Trust is a very old concept. It is also quite basic for humanity. But this does not mean that it has remained stable over time, or across different languages and cultures. Rather the concept is dynamic, with a malleable meaning potential, which can both change over time (history) and be situationally negotiated. It also ranges in applications from everyday life settings to broader societal networks and environments. Trust has its home base more in everyday reasoning, than in scientific rationality with its systematic doubt.

Petitot (2003) sets up a taxonomy of different kinds of trust (note: he uses French *confiance*), based on the analysis of a corpus of fairy tales. It seems to range between the extremes of naive trust to unlimited mistrust (one mistrusts everybody, as in paranoia). In between, one finds "confiance-attachement", in which there is trust on the basis of a close attachment, often with a strong emotional component, and mistrust is suspended, and "confiance-interprétation", in which one builds trust on a reflected consideration of experience of the other. In addition to this, there is "confiance-régulation", in which trust is mediated by third parties. These third parties would include authorities and institutions; for example, societal institutions have often created laws and rules that people,

including professionals, have to abide by. If we assume that they actually do so (to a large extent), it will increase our ability to predict how parties will act.

Comparative studies of trust in different cultures (e.g. Brazil, China, India, Russia, former Eastern Europe) have revealed differences in the concept of trust and confidence. So, if trust could be 'immediate', 'implicit' or 'unquestioned', there seems, nonetheless, to be a development in Western socio-cultures of a more reflected, calculated notion of confidence. This is probably part of the long development implying a gradual diminishing of *Gemeinschaft* and more space for *Gesellschaft*. But this change may have accelerated. Trustworthiness (of an institution, or person) now implies a sufficient record of accumulated merits (observed, even documented). You have confidence in the institution (or person), if the institution (person) has a trustworthy record. This is confidence in post-industrial societies, with an incessantly changing and "flexible" work order (Sennett, 1999).

## **5. Micro-interaction and macro-society**

Issues of trust are pertinent both in interpersonal, situated interaction and on the societal level (participation, democracy). Are there regular relations, for each specific culture/society, between interpersonal trust and macro-societal trust (trust/confidence in societal institutions, such as the banking system, the political parties, the police, science and scientists)? There might be characteristic differences between nations, with similar stories and kinds of trust at interpersonal and societal levels in some countries, e.g. the Brazilian case study as opposed to the different unofficial and official stories in former Eastern Europe.

## **6. Trust and cooperation**

Trust is a basic dimension in communication conceived of as cooperation and interaction. When we talk or write, we cannot make everything explicit, but must take for granted that the other is behaving 'normally', and hence predictably, under the given circumstances, and that he/she makes the same assumption about the other. Garfinkel, in his breaching experiments, explored the nature of such 'normality' assumptions.

What the norms and maxims of normal, cooperative communication are, has been explored by many, e.g. Habermas (truth, sincerity etc.), Grice (maxims of quantity, quality, clarity and relevance, in relation to purpose and need), Clark ('common ground').

## **7. The absence of trust in the pragmatics of language**

If trust is basic to communication, ubiquitous and taken-for-granted, one would expect it to be analysed by theorists of the pragmatics of language. While it seems to be present in the work of Wittgenstein, trust as a concept turns out, however, to be virtually absent from the work of

Austin, Searle, Grice, Sperber & Wilson, and Levinson. Searle, for example, analyses felicity conditions for speech acts entirely in the perspective of the speaker who issues the act ("cuts loose with an acoustic blast"!!); conventions of language, intentions, sincerity etc.; the reliance on the other is not there. (In effect, Searle analyses speech acts at an abstract level of types, rather than situated tokens, working with idealised speakers who know their language perfectly, etc. Levinson (2000) works with 'utterance types', still using concocted utterances in imagined (default) contexts.)

Our provisional conclusion is that leading pragmaticists (pragmatics taken in the narrow sense of pragmatics of language rather than the social pragmatics of communication in real life) have engaged in 'monologising practices', excluding the interpersonal dimensions, trying to reinterpret what is dialogical as something much more monological, and reducing pragmatics to issues of language conventions and speaker intentions. It would be an interesting research task to inquire more into the ways in which they manage to eliminate trust and its related dialogical dimensions (interdependence with the other, indeterminacy of interpretation of utterances, suspension of doubt, etc.).

#### **8. Monological and dialogical theorisations of trust**

Dialogicality concerns the basic interdependence of self and other. Trust, like so many other attributes of human relations, belongs to this realm of phenomena. We want to distinguish dialogicality, the (alleged) essence of human existence, from 'dialogism' as a general theoretical framework for understanding human action, cognition, communication and language. Such a framework, which is opposed to 'monologism', makes essential references to contexts, interaction, communicative construction, semiotic mediation and double dialogicality (in situated interaction and sociocultural practices). Monologism, by contrast, portrays cognition as information processing within the individual mind, communication as transfer from individual to individual of information and messages, and language as an abstract code with fixed pairings of expressions and meanings.

#### **9. Trust as the suspension of doubt**

Trust appears at many levels and in many dimensions of human relationships. Some amount of distrust or doubt, at some levels, is almost always present; you can not be certain about the future or the other. Simmel thought that trust builds on a 'weak form of inductive knowledge' and that it contains an 'element of unaccountable faith' (Möllering, 2001: 408-9).

#### **10. Implicitness**

Trust is implicit. Sartre claims that when I start to think about trust, it will be destroyed. When trust is explicitly explicitised, negotiated, etc.,

there is no real trust. Basic (and, if it exists, absolute) trust cannot be calculated; it involves the entire suspension of doubt (perhaps doubt has never dawned upon you). If, by contrast, there is calculation of intentions and possible reactions involved, there is distrust, sometimes a good deal of suspicion. This applies, for example, to mutual suspicion in the Middle East conflict, or in the cold war between U.S. and Soviet Union. There, parties never trust a message at its face value, texts are instead assiduously studied in attempts at ascertaining the true, but hidden, intentions. In between, we find the normal mundane world, in which trust and distrust are usually partial. Since we know that everybody is capable of hiding his or her thoughts and intentions from the other (and knows that the other is capable of the same), we cannot have absolute trust (or distrust).

### **11. Trust, risk and decision-making**

If trust is always needed, the related phenomenon of risk is also ubiquitous. Moreover, the latter is much more often thematised, especially in discourse on the late modern society (Giddens, 1991). 'Risk', however, is a very complex notion; in it involves both the (statistical) calculation of 'objective' probability of something harmful, and the subjective, emotionally charged apprehension of danger and risk threatening oneself as an individual (or as a member of a group). Both these are involved in many professional-client/patient encounters (e.g. Linell et al., 2002). In the latter sense, we come closer to 'trust'; a patient may (in some sense) suspend fears and live on the hope that she will not be the victim of the frightful disease.

### **12. Morality and trust**

Trust is related to morality. It is necessary both in contexts of sincerity and fellowship, and in contexts of conspiracy and deception (Baier, 1986). In this sense, Baier argues, trust is neutral; it can be exploited for different purposes. Several other commentators, primarily those who do not go for an entirely cognitive analysis of trust, have stressed the moral dimension of trust.

Here, we would like to be concerned specifically with trust and morality *in discourse*. The theoretical exploration of trust and confidence could possibly profit from analogies with the dialogical analysis of morality. Linell & Rommetveit (1998) offer at least three points of comparison:

a) The distinction of discourse-related ethics vs. topicalisation (or thematisation) of morality. The former refers to the fact that every action and utterance (*énonciation*) involves ethical/moral aspects: rights, obligations, responsibilities, accountability; he who makes an assertion must take epistemic responsibility for it, she who asks a question is obliged to be interested in the answer, etc. Topicalisation involves explicit verbalisation of moral issues (including 'moralisation'). Trust and

confidence issues can be thematised. Doubts and incipient feelings of distrust may get discursive reflections.

With respect to social representations, we may talk about trust that builds upon shared social representations (e.g. of national identity), vs. social representations *of trust* (when trust is thematised).

b) The second point concerns the distinction between authenticity (the sincere, 'true', embodied display of emotions, attitudes and thoughts) and tact/discretion/respect for the other's (and one's own) face needs and personal integrity. We can talk about immediate moral reactions vs. reflected morality (cf. public reactions to the Estonia catastrophe; first reactions vs. opinions 'on second thought').

c) Thirdly, Linell & Rommetveit were concerned with the treatment of moral issues in institutions. Though modern institutions, like health care, social welfare, unemployment agencies, educational institutions, the legal institutions investigating and sanctioning offences, deal with deeply moral issues, they often do so in a partly 'de-moralising' fashion, recontextualising the issues (on the surface) into medical-scientific, bureaucratic, legal etc. terms. Again, there are parallels with trust. What dimensions of trust and confidence emerge in a society, which has to organise specialised encounters between people who are in my respects strangers to each other (e.g. in professional-client encounters)? This brings us to the next point.

## **12. Secrets: Showing and hiding**

Trust is a moral concept, related to rights, responsibilities and obligations. It is multi-dimensional in many ways. One dimension is the authenticity – discretion dimension, and different patterns of disclosure vs. non-disclosure.

Showing and hiding can be recontextualised into the terms of authenticity vs. discretion. This also points to the close relation between *confidence* and *confidentiality*. Authenticity amounts to truthful and sincere expression of thoughts and feelings in front of somebody; thus, authenticity is other-oriented and contextualised. However, this is not a straightforward matter. One can pretend to be sincere and authentic. One can even pretend to be sincere and authentic to oneself (as Freud taught us). Trust is not only a matter of the trustee being rational, truthful, and sincere, of him telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. In many cultures, you are not supposed to share information with just anybody. This points to the importance of selective *disclosure*, and ways (styles) of disclosure. That is, apart from disclosure and non-disclosure, there is partial disclosure (half-truths etc.). Patterns of (non-)disclosure are intricately intertwined with social relations; we can talk about a 'politics of disclosure'. The timing of disclosure can also be important.

## **13. The third party**

The link between confidence and confidentiality underscores the importance of the *third party* (specific third or generalised third) who might misuse what I disclose to you (if you, in turn, disclose it to him or her); thus, trust and communication cannot be analysed only in terms of two parties, I and Thou, or self and other (although third parties could be a subcategory of 'the others'). The web of (naive) confidence vs. suspicion is sometimes woven to shield off third parties. The notions of discretion and secrecy presuppose categorisations of others into those with whom one shares knowledge and those from whom one hides (one special category of 'third parties'). But third parties also play other roles in communication, and with respect to trust and confidence.

#### **14. Genres and institutions**

The third point under morality has to do with variation across social situations. Trust works differently in different contexts, institutions etc. Most situated encounters involve both explicit and hidden agendas (e.g. job interviews). Different social situations involve different kinds of *limitations* on, limited expectations of, *relevant* trust/confidence (cf. Quéré, 2001): e.g. interaction with salesperson at supermarket cash-point vs. conversation with your therapist or psychiatrist. Or we could think of more extreme example of one's neighbour in post-war Czechoslovakia; you could not trust your closest neighbour because he could report you to the authorities or secret police, but you could rely on him when it came to borrowing a cup of sugar. There are norms of secrecy, limitations on disclosure and on dissemination of information about third persons in private life as well as in more anonymous contacts. So, the general question is: how does trust vary with activity types (communicative *genres*) and social encounters?

#### **15. Power and asymmetries**

Trust can be taken to be the antidote to power and domination. This view is particularly close at hand, when we are concerned with basic, existential trust, as in the relations of mother-infant. However, trust and power are interlaced in actual social life. Most human encounters are asymmetrical in nature; they involve an unequal distribution of power and participation. And yet they involve trust at different levels.

#### **16. Empirical method**

Given the points discussed above, how can trust be empirically studied in discourse? Here, we should distinguish between choice of theories and choice of data. Partly independent of the selection of specific data, one can treat data in or with monological or dialogical theories. (And theories can be treated as tools for research, in partly methodological terms.)

A provisional list of foci of research and of chapters in writing:

- Self-other: ontology and semantics of trust and confidence

- Basic concepts: authenticity – discretion, pre- vs proto-?
- Implicitness
- Asymmetries
- Others: concrete others, abstract others (institutions)
- Third parties, and secrets
- Genres and activity types
- Practices of disclosure, partial disclosure and non-disclosure

As regards data, there are basically three major kinds of empirical phenomena:

First, we argue that trust is a fundamental phenomenon in all communication. However, it is tacit and implicit. How then can we study it in discourse? Well, we can do a *theoretical* analysis of a few selected pieces of discourse to see e.g. what kinds of implicit assumptions interactants must rely on (even if they do not signal or topicalise these assumptions at all). That could be an attempt to identify such *assumptions at all levels*. It would most probably show that in order to mistrust some points in a person's discourse, you must trust a vast number of points at other levels.

Furthermore, one might go for studies of *more specific* phenomena, which may not give a complete picture of trust/distrust but parts of such a picture. For example, disclosing practices also have the advantage of being observable in discourse.

After all, the main avenue of research may still be one in which we study the indications (indices) of distrust, i.e. the partial *absence* of trust: indices of *misalignment* such as silences (but pauses are ambiguous), other perturbations of timing and smooth delivery of contributions, check-up questions (Linell, 2003). This may sometimes develop into a meta-discourse of explicit questioning of trust and confidence. But often, we cannot be certain that misalignments in discourse be interpreted as distrust indicators. It seems that we need other contextual cues as well, in order to interpret them in this way. What then are these factors?

Barring these reservations, can we use the occurrence of distrust to draw conclusions about what kinds of trust are missing? Can we observe different indicators of trust vs. distrust in *different activity types*? Actors in many social encounter (communicative activity) types move in and out of different framings, and thus reveal fragments of their usually implicit assumptions of trust.

In terms of methods and data, studies may therefore include:

- Focus group discussions
- Institutional discourse (clinical interviews, job interviews, doctor consultations, court trials, interviews with conscientious objectors, etc.)
- Breaching experiments (Garfinkel, Blakar, Grossen): trust in subject-researcher interaction; experimenters breaching the contract taken for granted by subjects.

These were the main theoretical and empirical issues that we have analysed in our internal seminars. In addition, we have organised seminars with other collaborators both from France and abroad in order to further develop these themes and to understand the relationships between trust, democracy and socio-cultural contexts.

## **II. Public seminars:**

**1.**

### **16<sup>th</sup> October - overview of the project, Reid Hall.**

Presented by I. Markova, Per Linell, Michele Grossen and Li Liu.

**2.**

### **13-15 November 2003 , Seminar on Trust and Culture**

Programme

#### **Reid Hall, 13 November**

14.30- 16.00 Geoffrey Hosking, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, The United Kingdom.

Why would a history of trust be useful?

16.15 - 17.45 Ivana Markova, Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, The United Kingdom.

Generating social representations from trust as a communicative thema

#### **MSH, 14 November**

9.30 - 11.00 Sandra Jovchelovitch, Department of Social Psychology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, The United Kingdom.

Trust in Brazil: a social psychological perspective

11.15- 12.45 Srikant Sarangi, Health Communication Research Centre, University of Cardiff, The United Kingdom.

Disclosure and the character of trust in India: a health communication

2.30 - 16.00 Geoffrey Hosking, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, The United Kingdom.

Structures of trust in Russia and Soviet Society

16.15 - 17.45 Li Liu, Department of Social Psychology, London School of Economic and Political Science, London, The United Kingdom. Filial piety, guanxi, loyalty and money: trust in China

#### **MSH, 15 November**

9.15-10.45 Ivana Markova, Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, The United Kingdom.

Forms of distrust in Central and Eastern Europe after Communism

11.00-12.00 General discussion

**3.**

**9 December, Reid Hall**

Ferenc Eros: **The changing trust in Hungary**

**4.**

**10 December, Trust in discourse: A dialogical perspective**

**Maison Suger, morning**

Michèle Grossen, University of Laussane, Switzerland

Per Linell, University of Linköping, Sweden

Li Liu, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Ivana Marková, University of Stirling, UK

Anne Salazar-Orvig, University Paris III, France

Trust in discourse: a dialogical approach

**Reid Hall, afternoon**

Anne Salazar-Orvig and Michèle Grossen: Thematising trust in focus group discussions

Per Linell: Competing concerns: patterns of trust and distrust in institutional encounters

### **III. The seminars and work in progress as a follow up of the IPAS:**

**7 February 2004.** I. Markova, **Trust and culture**, an invited lecture to the Royal Society of Historians, London.

**11-13 March, 2004, MSH:** I. Markova, P. Linell, M. Grossen, S. Jovchelovitch, F. Eros, A. Gillespie. A meeting on Trust and Culture, organised under the auspices of the LEPS. Chapters of the book in preparation were discussed. Contributors (preliminary list): L.Liu (trust in China); S. Sarangi (in India); S. Jovchelovitch (in Brazil); F. Eros (in Hungary); M. Klicperova (In Czech Republic); E. Mathias (in Estonia); I. Markova (Western Europe); G. Hosking (Russia); and 2 conceptual chapters by the core group (Markova, Linell, Grossen, Salazar-Orvig).

**27<sup>th</sup> April, 2004:** meeting of I. Markova, P. Linell, M. Grossen and Anne Salazar Orvig, under the auspices of the MSH. Discussion of chapters for the book in preparation. The proposal for a book entitled **Dialogue in focus groups: exploring socially shared knowledge** by these four authors has now been submitted to publishers with the view of completing the manuscript by 31<sup>st</sup> December 2004. (See section 16 above in the main part of the report).

**25<sup>th</sup> May 2004. A seminar on: Reconstruire la confiance dans les économies en transition d'Europe centrale, Nanterre University, Paris**  
Emmanuel Mathias, (Paris 1), Olivier Stintzy, (MODEM)  
Discutante: Ivana Markova (U. de Stirling)

The third book on **Trust in Discourse** (see the main part of the report) is more demanding and will require the group to continue working on this topic in 2005.

We are considering a possibility of organising an international conference on Trust, culture and citizenship under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, the British Academy and the MSH. The purpose of this conference would be to further develop theoretical and applied social scientific concepts relating to trust, discourse and social representations.